http://www.dslreports.com/forum/r19620593-Ebo ... DigitalAgePluto"Again, the goal is to run high volumes of cards against small amounts multiplied, times numerous simultaneous sites. If the victim catches it give them a fake email address that used it. Quickly give them a credit to prevent a $25 charge back fee, and to prevent triggering a high charge back alert with the merchant account. Tell the victim someone must have used the card on the site. Suggest it even may have been stolen to divert attention away from the operation. keep the cyber mule out of the loop, maximize the return and longevity for each operating domain.
Viewed at the lowest common denominator it is a handful of victims complaining about a trivial charge on their card from one little website. That is not going to trigger any bank investigation, is it spread among many. It also is way below the threshold to trigger any Federal snooping around. Even if a site goes down the rest of the hub are preserved, they do not appear related. If a division goes down, the other divisions still function. Everything hums unless someone grasps the big picture and identifies it as a multi million dollar operation. Add the costs of replacing the cards and we have an annual loss barking at $70 million. But who knows how big it really is.
Most certainly this structure was built around the fact that the syndicate has direct access to this card account data, and volumes of it. The operation is vertical, they are not buying data from carding forums.
While the location and method of the card access is a priority to discover, notable mention of the clear weakness in the merchant account vetting process must not be ignored. There are numerous symptoms indicating that these sites are not legit even before the charge back ratio grows to trigger levels. No traffic, no outbound mail, robots disallow. Card data detail entry reports that would show that the data is batched, and is not coming randomly from assorted IPs as a typical site would have. It is not that it cannot happen every now and then, but for a multi year criminal syndicate to operate well over 100+ domains with impunity, over and over, and not trigger any alert. Would it be so rewarding to criminals if Authorize.net and others did not front the money right away and instead held two months in reserve for new sites, that would enable the charges to cycle. Clearly some changes need to be made, much of this fraud has become acceptable and is tolerated as past of the given percentage that is wrote off annually."
" just ran some new searches after completing the above, and found a news article that I had previously missed. This July 07 notice from the Michigan Attorney General may be a partial reason for the ver 4.5 template sites phasing out and the full blast of ebook sightings. A cyber mule was arrested and charged:
quote:
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Office of the Attorney General:
Cox Charges Woman with ID Theft
Agency: Attorney General
July 19, 2007
LANSING -- Attorney General Mike Cox today announced that he has charged Krystal Owens of Detroit with three-counts of identity theft and one-count of conspiring to commit identity theft.
"Identity theft is a devastating crime to its victims," said Cox. "My office will continue to be vigilant in defending Michigan's citizens from having their identities stolen."
Since January 2007, the Michigan Attorney General's Office has received more than 130 complaints from consumers across the country indicating that K.A.T.O. Technology, LLC, also known as K.A.M.K. Technology, LLC, had charged $12.95 against their credit card without their permission. The Attorney General's investigation found that in the summer of 2006, the defendant Krystal Owens conspired with Tomas Lasinkas of POV Web Design Solutions to set up bogus corporations, banking accounts, and other arrangements thereby enabling Lasinkas to make unauthorized charges against consumers credit card accounts using the bogus company names K.A.T.O. Technology, LCC and K.A.M.K. Technology, LLC. From September 2006 to March 2006, Lasinkas made 75 to 100 unauthorized charges, at $12.95 each, on a daily basis, and Owens wired the illegal proceeds to Lasinkas' bank accounts in Bulgaria on a regular basis. Lasinkas and Owens accumulated approximately $200,000 by way of this fraudulent activity during a six month period.
A criminal charge is merely an accusation, and the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. The penalty for identity theft is up to 5 years in prison and/or a fine up to $10,000.
..."
It would appear this operation is still running.
